On September 11 th , 2001, the United States came under vicious, bloody attack. Americans died in their places of work. They died on American soil. They died not as combatants, but as innocent victims. They died not from traditional armies waging traditional campaigns, but from the brutal faceless weapons of terror. They died as the victims of war -a war that many had feared but whose sheer horror took America by surprise.
- intelligence collection and analysis efforts to combat terrorism in their theater intelligence planning. The success or failure of this operational intelligence effort to combat terrorism in each of the CINC's AORs could have major strategic effects for the United States.
Clearly, a comprehensive strategy for combatting terrorism will require a unified effort that encompasses all of the instruments of national power including diplomatic, informational, economic, and military entities. Terrorism has been traditionally regarded as a crime, and thus DoD does not have lead agency responsibility for combatting terrorism. The mission of the Office shall be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office shall perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission, including the functions specified in section 3 of this order. 4 This new agency may change these interagency relationships in the effort to combat terrorism, but as of this writing it is not yet clear how that will occur. This paper will not examine the merits of different organizational approaches to combatting terrorism, nor will it focus on the strategic intelligence efforts of the national intelligence community, executed by agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Rather, it will focus on the operational intelligence capabilities that geographic CINC's can provide to the unified effort for combatting terrorism (particularly terrorist use of CBRNE), recognizing that DoD is not necessarily the sole or primary means to achieve U.S. policy objectives in combatting terrorism. This paper will utilize the definition of "combatting terrorism" contained in Joint The New Strategic Setting
The "911" terrorist attack unquestionably altered the strategic setting for the United
States. In order to understand the impact of the new strategic setting on the operational employment of military forces, the linkage between the strategic and operational levels must The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders, as appropriate under U.S. law. U.S. Forces will provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defense and uphold U.S. commitments under NORAD. In addition, DoD components have the responsibility, as specified in U.S. law, to support U.S. civil authorities as directed in managing the consequences of natural and man-made disasters and CBRNE-related events on U.S. territory. Finally, the U.S. military will be prepared to respond in a decisive manner to acts of international terrorism committed on U.S. territory or the territory of an ally. 7 Defending the nation from attack is the foundation of strategy. As the tragic September terror attacks demonstrate, potential adversaries will seek to threaten the centers of gravity of the United States, its allies, and its friends… Therefore, the defense strategy restores the emphasis once placed on defending its land, sea, air, and space approaches. The attacks against the U.S. homeland in September, 2001 demonstrate that terrorist groups possess both the motivations and capabilities to conduct devastating attacks on U.S. territory, citizens, and infrastructure. Often these groups have the support of state sponsors or enjoy the sanctuary and protection of states, but some have the resources and capabilities to operate without state sponsorship. In addition, the rapid proliferation of CBRNE technology gives rise to the danger that future terrorist attacks might involve such weapons. 9 QDR 2001 clearly sets defense of the homeland as the number one priority for U.S.
military forces and recognizes that terrorism, potentially using CBRNE weapons, constitutes a serious threat to the homeland. This leads to the next question: How can DoD forces be employed to defend the homeland against terrorist CBRNE threats? The strategies for protecting the homeland from terrorist CBRNE attack fall along a spectrum ranging from non-proliferation through counter-force operations as shown below in Figure 1 :
While none of these strategies are mutually exclusive of the others, they each need to be examined independently as they will result in different courses of action for DoD forces. In shaping a peaceful international environment favorable to US interests, US policies and strategies seek to prevent and limit the proliferation of NBC capabilities through international agreements and treaties, multilateral initiatives, and unilateral actions. The Armed Forces of the United States support these policies and strategies within their respective roles and functions. 10 There are a number of international treaties in place that seek to prevent proliferation, including the Treaty on The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention. There are three basic problems that have limited the effectiveness of non-proliferation schemes. The first is that not all nations are signatories to these treaties; for example, 20 nations, including Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, have not signed the CWC. 11 Second, there is a general lack of credible inspection processes to ensure compliance. The final problem is that the treaties govern nation-states; non-state actors such as terrorist organizations are not signatories and therefore may not consider this form of international law binding. Thus, while non-proliferation will continue to be a cornerstone of U.S. policy, it is insufficient in and of itself to protect the U.S. homeland from CBRNE attack.
Non-proliferation. Non-proliferation is an integral tool
Consequence Management. Consequence management (CM) attempts to limit the effects of a CBRNE incident, both through pre-planned responses and crisis management. Joint Task Consequence management is a critical element of combatting CBRNE terrorism, but it is a reactive concept that does not defend the U.S. from CBRNE attack. It must be combined with other strategies to effectively defend the homeland.
Passive Defense. Current DoD doctrine for passive NBC defense centers on the three principles of contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination. 13 Contamination avoidance requires detecting the presence of CBRN hazards and minimizing personnel exposure. Protection of individuals is usually accomplished collectively through NBC shelters, or individually through protective garments and breathing apparatus. These methods may be a suitable passive defense solution for a fielded force of 500,000 military personnel such as the U.S. deployment to the Arabian Gulf in 1991. However, passive defense is certainly not a practical solution for a country of 280 million people dispersed across more than 3.7 million square miles. It is simply too large of an area with too many people to train and equip for personal protection. Some of these principles such as contamination avoidance could be applied by employing NBC detection devices near major urban areas. This would aid in determining the extent of contamination of a CBRN attack, and help to minimize the number of people that are exposed. Again, though, this is a limited effort that would only minimize -not prevent -the effects of a CBRN attack.
Deterrence. PDD-39 states:
The United States shall seek to deter terrorism through a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors. Our actions will reduce the capabilities and support available to terrorists.
14 "Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer" states:
Demonstrated military capability is the cornerstone of deterrence, which remains a principal means for dissuading would-be aggressors and adversaries from action harmful to the United States." First, the terrorists most likely to threaten U.S. interests present few suitable military targets, especially high-value targets whose destruction would be very costly to the terrorists… Second, nonphysical effects of a military strike may serve some of the political and organizational purposes of terrorist leaders, and for that reason they may tacitly welcome such an attack… Third, the terrorists' response to a retaliatory strike may be counter-retaliation rather than good behavior. 16 The U.S. retaliatory cruise missile strikes in 1998 following the African embassy bombings failed to deter Al Qaeda from executing the USS COLE (DDG-67) and "911" attacks. The magnitude of the U.S.-led military coalition response in Afghanistan following the "911" attacks may change the deterrent calculus for other terrorist organizations and the states harboring them, but that is undetermined as of this writing.
These four counterterrorism strategies, singularly or in combination, will not adequately ensure that the homeland will be defended from terrorist CBRNE attack. Thus, a concerted effort to defend the homeland must include two more aggressive strategies -active defense and counterforce operations.
Active Defense and Counterforce. Joint Pub 3-11 clearly states the necessity of active defense and possibly counterforce operations to supplement passive NBC defense:
While a necessary part of the solution to the NBC threat, passive NBC defense is insufficient in and of itself. In addition to passive defense measures, neutralizing the threat will require effective application of other military capabilities, in particular active defense measures and counterforce operations. The same can be said of counterforce operations; the U.S. military has many offensive weapons in its arsenal that are capable of striking directly at the heart of terrorist Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims. 21 The Washington Post reported that Pakistani intelligence discovered that two retired
Pakistani nuclear scientists met with bin Laden in the Afghan capital of Kabul and discussed nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons with him. The two scientists stated that bin Laden indicated that he had obtained, or had access to, some type of radiological material that he said had been acquired for him by the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. 22 Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda are but one clear example of the CBRNE terrorist threat.
The "What?" part of this question is partially answered by the acronym CBRNEChemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Enhanced high explosive weapons. While there are significant technical hurdles (the Canadian Security Intelligence Service publication "Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism" provides a good discussion of these challenges) that terrorists must overcome to effectively employ CBRNE weapons the question seems to be not "if" but "when" these challenges will be solved. 23 A brief description of each of the CBRNE weapons follows, along with historical examples of terrorist employment of these weapons.
Chemical. Chemical weapons are generally defined as the use of a toxic poison such that the chemical effects on exposed personnel result in incapacitation or death. 24 The Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system in March of 1995 released an estimated 159 ounces of Sarin between 5 subway trains, resulting in twelve deaths and over 5,500 casualties reporting to medical treatment facilities. 25 It took four hours and fifteen minutes for Japanese health officials to conclusively determine that Sarin was the causative agent. 26 However, the Aum Shinrikyo attacks demonstrated the difficulty of dispersing a sufficiently lethal quantity over a large area to produce "mass" casualties. Aum
Shinrikyo's relatively rudimentary dispersal method was aided by the fact that it was conducted in the enclosed environment of a subway. Effective dispersal over an open-air area (such as a large urban center) would be much more problematic.
Biological.
A biological weapon is generally defined as the use of a pathogen to induce incapacitation or death. 27 However, the most daunting challenge for a terrorist to employ biological weapons is the same as the chemical weapons challenge: dispersal. Contagious agents do not suffer from this problem, but non-contagious agents such as anthrax must be widely dispersed in order to cause mass casualties. Aum Shinrikyo failed in ten known attempts in Japan to conduct biological attacks with either anthrax or botulinum toxin.
Despite the cult's vast resources (approximately $1 billion) and access to trained scientists, it has been unable to overcome the technical hurdles associated with the acquisition, cultivation, and delivery of biological weapons.
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Radiological. Radiological weapons, also known as "dirty bombs" or Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD's), are notionally conceived as conventional high explosive devices that disperse radioactive material in order to create a radiation hazard to humans. In 1995,
Chechen rebels placed a 30-pound container of radioactive cesium in a Moscow park. 29 The device was intended to produce psychological shock rather than physical harm, and Russian officials quickly removed and disposed of the device without any serious harm. However, the incident underscored the potential dangers of a radiological terrorist attack and demonstrated that U.S. non-proliferation policies have not been 100% effective. Since 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency has tracked 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear materials and 201 cases of trafficking in radioactive materials used for medical and industrial purposes. Only eighteen of these cases involved plutonium or highly enriched uranium, the "weapons-usable" material that is required to make a nuclear bomb -the material in all other cases would have been suitable only for radiological weapons. A simple nuclear device of the Hiroshima design is actually not the easiest nuclear capability for a proliferator to acquire, be he a terrorist or a rogue state actor. Although the design is now almost fifty years old, the Hiroshima device, also called a "gun-type" weapon, requires a large amount of nuclear material to achieve a nuclear explosion. We assume that 15-30 kg of highly enriched uranium or 3-4 kg of plutonium are needed for a sophisticated nuclear weapon. Cruder devices may require more. One estimate, for example, places the likely size of a Pakistani weapon at around 1,500 pounds. Therefore, although achieving a workable trigger device and other components would not be a trivial matter, the principal barrier to acquiring a nuclear weapon is the large amount of weapons-usable material that is needed. 31 However, it is not beyond the realm of the possible for a terrorist organization to acquire and employ a nuclear device.
Enhanced High Explosive With Mass Consequences. The term "Enhanced High
Explosive" has many different conceptualizations. Fuel-Air Effect (FAE) weapons are examples of enhanced high explosives, but in a terrorism context the term generally means any weapon that produces enhanced effects beyond those of a normal conventional explosive device. In this sense, flying an airliner in the World
Trade Center could be defined as an enhanced high explosive, as it would have required an extremely large conventional explosive to achieve the level of destruction that the "911" attack achieved.
Where and When?
The questions of "Where?" and "When?" are precisely the questions that the ISR network can potentially answer, regardless of the endgame chosen to counter the threat. Part of the where and when question is answered by examining the phases of manufacture, storage, and transportation prior to employment of a terrorist CBRNE attack as depicted in Figure 
Recommendations for the Geographic CINC's
The following recommendations are concluded from this paper.
1. Geographic CINCs should ensure that combatting terrorism, particularly using CBRNE weapons, receives the highest priority in the PIRs for their AOR. This will drive intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination efforts to enhance the effectiveness of combatting terrorism across the entire spectrum of strategies, ranging from non-proliferation to counterforce operations. This elevation in priority will help to defend the homeland against terrorist attack and provide the added benefit of improving AT/FP in their AORs.
2. The CINCs should demand the procurement of advanced CBRN detection technology to aid in the effort to detect the manufacture, storage, transport, and employment of CBRN weapons. While this might be considered primarily a Title X responsibility for each of the services in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process, the CINCs can influence the PPBS process by increasing the priority of CBRN detection equipment on their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). This would improve the effort to combat terrorist use of CBRN and also improve NBC capability in a traditional state-on-state conflict in their AOR. How the Office of Homeland Security will implement these changes is not yet clear.
What is clear is that the geographic CINCs have a strategic mandate to defend the homeland, and CBRNE terrorism is a serious threat to the homeland. The first step in combatting terrorism is to gain knowledge of the enemy -intelligence. The CINCs should elevate the collection of intelligence to combat terrorism to the top priority for their ISR networks. These demons must be found and dealt with harshly before they are able to wreak more destruction on the U.S and her allies.
